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JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from a final order entered on January 23, 2001, by Judge 
Gary D. Stott of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of 
Utah. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion of Defendant Lars 
Lynge ("Lynge") to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction when Lynge did not 
conduct substantial and continuous local activity in Utah, when Lynge otherwise did not 
engage in any activities within Utah out of which Plaintiffs' claims arose or that caused 
injury in Utah, and when Lynge was not a party to any contract containing a forum 
selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion of Defendant Gorm 
International Corporation ("Gorm") to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction when 
Gorm did not conduct substantial and continuous local activity in Utah, when Gorm did 
not engage in any activities within Utah out of which Plaintiffs' claims arose or that 
caused injury in Utah, and when Gorm entered into a contract - to which Plaintiffs 
were not a party - that contained a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause under 
which Gorm agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Utah for resolution of 
any conflict or litigation arising under the contract. 
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Standard of Review: 
The Court reviews for correctness a trial court's decision to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction based upon the memoranda of points and authorities and affidavits 
submitted by the parties. Phone Directories v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, \ 2, 8 P.3d 
256; see Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 
1992). 
STATUTES AND CONTRACT PROVISIONS OF 
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (1998): 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a 
citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does 
any of the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an 
individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of 
this state as to any claim arising out of or related to: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this 
state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether 
tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real 
estate situated in this state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or 
risk located within this state at the time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate 
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in the marital 
relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent 
departure from the state; or the commission in this state of 
the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a 
mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the 
defendant had no control; or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this 
state which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, 
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Chapter 45 a, to determine paternity for the purpose of 
establishing responsibility for child support. 
2. Section 1 of Distributor Agreement between Defendant Gorm International 
Corp. and Nu Skin International: 
DEFINITIONS 
* * * 
Contract: The Agreement between a Distributor and Nu Skin Enterprises is 
composed of these Policies and Procedures, the Sales Compensation Plan, 
Distributor Agreement, Partnership/Corporation From and supplemental Sponsor 
Agreements. The Contract is the complete and only Agreement between Nu 
Skin Enterprises and a Distributor. 
3. Section 27 of Distributor Agreement between Defendant Gorm International 
Corp. and Nu Skin International: 
GOVERNING LAW 
The place of origin of this Contract, the place where the Company accepted the 
offer of a prospective Distributor to form the Contract, is the State of Utah. 
This Contract is to be construed with respect to its validity and performance 
obligations thereunder, in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah 
applicable to contracts made and to be wholly performed within such State. A 
Distributor agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Utah 
for resolution of any conflict or litigation arising under or purporting to interpret 
the Contract. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case And Course Of The Proceedings 
This case involves an action brought in Utah by residents of Texas against 
residents of Colorado. 
Plaintiffs, as distributors for Nu Skin International Corp. ("Nu Skin"), bring 
three separate claims for breach of contract against the three Defendants who had 
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entered into separate distributor agreements with Nu Skin - Clifton Associates, Inc., 
Gorm International Corporation, and Dennis Clifton. The first claim is that these three 
Defendants breached their respective distributor agreements with Nu Skin "by 
encouraging, enticing and otherwise assisting another Distributor to transfer to a 
different sponsor." (ffl 85-92 of First Amended Complaint; R. 221-22.) The second 
claim is identical, except that Plaintiffs additionally allege that they are third-party 
beneficiaries of these three Defendants' respective agreements with Nu Skin, (f f 93-
101 of First Amended Complaint; R. 220-21.) The third contract claim is that these 
three Defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in their 
respective agreements with Nu Skin, (ff 109-13 of First Amended Complaint; R. 
219.) 
Additionally, Plaintiffs assert a tort claim against all of the Defendants for 
wrongful interference with contractual relations, and a claim for unjust enrichment 
alleging that all of the Defendants wrongfully interfered with and usurped an economic 
benefit provided to Plaintiffs under their own distributor agreement with Nu Skin, (^f 
102-108 and 114-20 of First Amended Complaint; R. 219-20.) 
Plaintiffs filed the original Complaint on March 29, 2000. In that complaint, Nu 
Skin was named as a defendant but was voluntarily dismissed from the case by 
Plaintiffs on the basis of an arbitration agreement in Plaintiffs' distributor agreement 
with Nu Skin. (R. 82-83.) The dismissal was effected even before Defendants' 
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respective counsel made their appearances and moved to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. 
In May 2000, Lynge and Gorm, through separate counsel, each filed motions to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Add. Ex.'s 2 through 6), as did defendants 
Dennis Clifton, David Clifton and Clifton Associates, Inc. (the "Clifton Defendants"), 
through their own counsel. The motions were supported by affidavits of the respective 
Defendants, evidencing their lack of activities in Utah. 
On July 18, 2000, oral argument on the motions was conducted by Judge Ray 
M. Harding, Jr. Judge Harding took the motions under advisement, requesting that Nu 
Skin submit an affidavit indicating what it believed to be the intent, if any, of the forum 
selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause contained in Nu Skin's distributor agreement 
with respect to claims solely between distributors who have not contracted with each 
other, as opposed to claims between the actual parties to the agreement, i.e., between 
Nu Skin and the contracting distributor. (R. 214.) 
In a letter to Judge Harding dated July 19, 2000 - the day after the hearing 
conducted by Judge Harding on the motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 
- Plaintiffs, through their counsel, informed the trial court that they did not want to 
have the court consider the validity of the arbitration clause contained in the parties' 
respective distributor agreements with Nu Skin. Plaintiff also acknowledged in that 
letter that Lynge and defendant David Clifton, as individuals, were not Nu Skin 
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distributors and, on that basis alone, were not subject to any arbitration clause upon 
which Plaintiffs could base a demand for mandatory arbitration. (R. 215-16.) 
Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint, dated July 26, 2000, restating 
various claims against Defendants and asserting an alternative demand for mandatory 
arbitration between the parties based on the parties' respective distributor agreements 
with Nu Skin. (R. 217-231.) 
On August 1, 2000, after filing the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs entered 
into a stipulation filed with the trial court. (R. 235-39.) In the stipulation, Plaintiffs 
acknowledged that they withdrew their request that the court consider the issues of 
arbitration at that time. (R. 237.) The issues for the trial court, then, were deemed by 
the parties to center on whether by executing a distributor agreement with Nu Skin 
containing a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause, the Defendant distributors 
consented to personal jurisdiction in Utah in a civil action brought by other distributors, 
and not by Nu Skin - the other party to the contract containing the forum 
selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause. (Id.) 
On August 29, 2000, Judge Harding recused himself, and the case was 
reassigned to Judge Gary Stott. (R. 247.) 
On November 29, 2000, Judge Stott conducted a second hearing on the pending 
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Hearing Transcript, R. 280.) 
Judge Stott granted the motions and entered an Order approved by counsel for all of the 
parties and signed by the court on January 23, 2001. (R. 257-60, Add. Ex. 1.) The 
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court granted the motions based on the supporting memoranda of the respective 
Defendants, which were accompanied by affidavits of the Defendants. (R. 258.) 
B. Statement Of Facts 
1. Lynge is an individual residing in the state of Colorado. (Affidavit of 
Lars Lynge at t 3; R. 166.) Gorm is a Colorado corporation. (Affidavit of Guy 
Humphries at 1 4; R. 132.) 
2. Neither Lynge nor Gorm transacts any business within the state of Utah. 
(Affidavit of Lars Lynge at f 4; R. 166; Affidavit of Guy Humphries at 1 5; R. 132.) 
3. Neither Lynge nor Gorm has caused any injury within the state of Utah, 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at t 5; R. 166.) 
4. Gorm executed a corporate distributorship agreement with Nu Skin on or 
about March 20, 1996. Until December 1, 1996, Lynge was a "Principal Partner" in 
and listed on the Partnership/Corporation Form of Gorm's corporate distributor 
agreement with Nu Skin. As of December 1, 1996, Lynge voluntarily terminated his 
role in the Gorm distributorship, when it became apparent that Nu Skin was not going 
to commence operations in his native country of Denmark for the foreseeable future. 
(Affidavit of Lars Lynge at 1 6; R. 166.) 
5. The tortious conduct that Plaintiffs alleged Lynge engaged in took place 
between February 1997 and September 1997, when Lynge was not involved in Gorm. 
(Amended Complaint at f1f 42-55; R. 225-26.) 
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6. Lynge's only contacts with the state of Utah have been in his capacity as 
an officer or employee of Gorm. Those contacts have consisted only of attending two 
Nu Skin company-wide conventions in Utah (in 1996 and 1998) and discussing with Nu 
Skin officials their plans for opening countries in Europe. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at 
f9 ;R. 165.) 
7. Neither Lynge nor Gorm has had a place of business in Utah. They have 
not recruited prospective distributors residing in Utah, have not been licensed to do 
business in Utah, have not placed advertisements in Utah, have not sent direct mailings 
into Utah, have not maintained a web site accessible to residents of Utah, have not sold 
product into Utah, have not generated any business volume from Utah, and have not 
conducted or participated in any opportunity or sales meetings in Utah. Neither has had 
any dealings of any kind with the Plaintiffs in the state of Utah. Lynge was recruited to 
participate in Nu Skin in his resident state of Colorado, and his activities relating to Nu 
Skin have been conducted almost entirely from his home and office in Colorado and in 
Europe. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at if 9; R. 165.) 
8. All of the tortious conduct in which Plaintiffs allege Lynge and Gorm 
engaged took place outside of the state of Utah, and any of the alleged injury 
complained of from that alleged conduct was felt in Texas - not in Utah - where the 
two Plaintiffs reside. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at % 10; R. 165.) 
9. All of the conduct or activities giving rise to Plaintiffs' allegations against 
Gorm for breach of contract took place outside of the state of Utah, and the activities 
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alleged by Plaintiffs affected Plaintiffs in Texas and did not affect any persons or 
businesses within the state of Utah. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at t 12; R. 164.) 
10. Neither Lynge nor Gorm has had any contractual relationship with either 
Plaintiff. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at f 11; R. 164.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court was correct in ruling that the court did not have personal 
jurisdiction over defendants Lynge and Gorm. They were not conducting substantial 
and continuous local activity in the forum state, nor did Plaintiffs' claims arise out of 
the particular activities of Lynge and Gorm in the forum state. Finally, in this instance, 
the forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause in Gorm's contract with Nu Skin does 
not establish specific personal jurisdiction over either Lynge or Gorm. 
Utah courts clearly do not have general jurisdiction over Lynge and Gorm. 
Neither defendant has conducted substantial and continuous local activity in the forum 
state. While Gorm is a party to a contract containing a forum selection/consent-to-
jurisdiction clause, the existence of such a clause does not create contacts with the 
forum state sufficient to establish general jurisdiction. Moreover, Lynge is not even a 
party to the contract containing the forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause. 
Finally, from a review of the Brief of Appellants, it does not appear as though Plaintiffs 
even contend that Lynge and Gorm are subject to general personal jurisdiction in this 
state. Indeed, Plaintiffs' analysis deals only with whether Lynge and Gorm are subject 
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to specific personal jurisdiction, based on the existence of Gorm's contract with Nu 
Skin. 
Similarly, Lynge is not subject to specific personal jurisdiction in this state. He 
did not purposefully direct any activities at any residents of the forum state, and, even 
if there were such activities - which there were not - the claims asserted in this 
litigation do not arise out of or relate to any such activities. Moreover, any contacts of 
Lynge were in his capacity as a principal of the corporation. The exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over Lynge, therefore, would violate both Utah's long-arm statute and 
constitutional due process requirements. 
Except for the forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause in its contract with 
Nu Skin, Gorm, like Lynge, did not purposefully direct any activities at any residents 
of the forum state, and, even if there were such activities - which there were not - the 
claims asserted in this litigation do not arise out of or relate to any such activities. 
The forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause does not give rise to specific 
jurisdiction because Gorm's contract was with Nu Skin - not Plaintiffs. Gorm did not 
consent to litigate claims in Utah with strangers to the contract such as Plaintiffs. The 
plain reading of the adhesion contract supports such a conclusion, and the very 
definition of the "contract" clearly states that the contract is between Nu Skin and a 
distributor - not a contract with the thousands upon thousands of Nu Skin distributors 
located and operating throughout the world. Moreover, in this case, the requisite 
rational nexus between Utah and either the parties or the transactions that are the 
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subject matter of the contract does not exist. As with Lynge, the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over Gorm would violate both Utah's long-arm statute and constitutional 
due process requirements. 
ARGUMENT 
A. General Principles Of Utah Law Governing The Exercise Of Personal 
Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Defendants, 
Utah courts recognize two types of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents: 
general and specific. The Court has recently reiterated the differences between the two 
theories: 
Generally, '[pjersonal jurisdiction can be broken down into two 
categories. Either a court has general jurisdiction over a defendant or it 
has specific jurisdiction. General personal jurisdiction permits a court to 
exercise power over a defendant without regard to the subject of the claim 
asserted. For such jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must be conducting 
substantial and continuous local activity in the forum state. In contrast, 
specific personal jurisdiction gives a court power over a defendant only 
with respect to claims arising out of the particular activities of the 
defendant in the forum state. For such jurisdiction to exist, the defendant 
must have certain minimum local contacts.' 
Phone Directories v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, \ 11, 8 P.3d 256, quoting Arguello v. 
Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992) (emphasis in 
original). 
In this case, as discussed below, neither Lynge nor Gorm is subject to 
either general or specific personal jurisdiction. 
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B. Lynge's And Gorm's Contacts With Utah Are Inadequate To Establish 
General Jurisdiction, 
Lynge's and Gorm's contacts with Utah are not sufficient to support a finding of 
general jurisdiction. Neither Lynge nor Gorm has had a place of business in Utah. 
They have not recruited prospective distributors residing in Utah, have not been 
licensed to do business in Utah, have not placed advertisements in Utah, have not sent 
direct mailings into Utah, have not maintained a web site accessible to residents of 
Utah, have not sold product into Utah, have not generated any business volume from 
Utah, and have not conducted or participated in any opportunity or sales meetings in 
Utah. Neither has had any dealings of any kind with the Plaintiffs in the state of Utah. 
Lynge was recruited to participate in Nu Skin in his resident state of Colorado, and his 
activities relating to Nu Skin have been conducted almost entirely from his home and 
office in Colorado and in Europe. 
These contacts do not rise to the level of "substantial and continuous" required 
under Utah law. Indeed, these contacts with Utah are far less than those of the 
defendant corporation in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 
408, 416, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2nd 404 (1984). In that case, the United States 
Supreme Court found that Texas did not have general jurisdiction over a Colombian 
corporation. The Colombian company had sent its chief executive officer to Texas for 
one contract negotiation session, accepted checks drawn on a Texas bank, purchased 
helicopters, equipment and training services from a Texas company and sent personnel 
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to Texas for training. Noting that the defendant corporation did not have a place of 
business in Texas and was not licensed to do business there, the court found that the 
defendant's contacts with Texas could not be described or regarded as "continuous and 
systematic" in nature. Id. at 416-17. 
Additionally, these contacts are far less than those of other defendants over 
whom courts have declined to exercise general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Harnischfeger 
Eng'rs v. Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 883 F.Supp. 608, 612 (D. Utah 1995) (defendant's 
sales in Utah amounted to one-tenth of 1% of the defendant's total business 
nationwide). Neither Lynge nor Gorm has sold any product in Utah. 
Indeed, Plaintiffs apparently do not contend in their brief that the trial court had 
general jurisdiction over Lynge and Gorm. Their sole contention apparently is that the 
defendants consented to jurisdiction in Utah through their respective distributor 
agreements, thereby giving rise to specific jurisdiction over them. Lynge does not even 
have a distributor agreement with Nu Skin. Moreover, Plaintiffs have acknowledged 
that Lynge was not a Nu Skin distributor, and as such he was not subject to the terms of 
the Nu Skin distributor agreement. (See R. 215-16, Letter from Edward W. McBride, 
Jr., to Judge Raymond M. Harding, Jr., Add. Ex. 7.) 
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C. Lynge's And Gorm's Contacts With Utah Are Inadequate To Establish 
Specific Jurisdiction. 
To be subject to specific personal jurisdiction under Utah law, Lynge's and 
Gorm's acts or contacts with Utah must satisfy the three-part inquiry set forth in 
Harnischfeger. 
(1) the defendant's acts or contacts with Utah must implicate Utah 
under the Utah long-arm statute; (2) a 'nexus' must exist between the 
plaintiff's claims and the defendant's acts or contacts; and (3) application 
of the Utah long-arm statute must satisfy the requirements of federal due 
process. 
Phone Directories v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64 at \ 12, quoting, Harnischfeger Eng'rs, 
Inc. v. Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 608, 612-13 (D. Utah 1995). Analysis of 
this three-part inquiry demonstrates that Lynge and Gorm are not subject to specific 
personal jurisdiction in Utah. 
Acts implicating Utah under Utah's long-arm statute include: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether 
tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate 
situated in this state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk 
located within this state at the time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, 
or child support, having resided, in the marital relationship, 
within this state notwithstanding subsequent departure from 
the state; or the commission in this state of the act giving 
rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a mere omission, 
failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendant had 
no control; or 
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(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state 
which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 
45a, to determine paternity for the purpose of establishing 
responsibility for child support. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (1998). None of these subsections is satisfied nor are the 
requirements of the long-arm statute met. 
The particular activities in Utah of Lynge and Gorm consisted only of Gorm -
recruited in Colorado - signing up in Colorado as a distributor of Nu Skin, a Utah 
corporation, and Lynge's attendance at two company-wide conventions held in Utah in 
1996 and 1998 and discussing with Nu Skin officials their plans for opening countries 
in Europe. Such activity is not sufficient to satisfy the Harnischfeger three-part 
inquiry, including any of the subsections of the long-arm statute. 
Indeed, none of the conduct complained of by Plaintiffs in this action even took 
place in Utah or caused any injury in Utah. Rather, the conduct complained of 
allegedly took place in Colorado, where the Defendants reside and operated, and any 
injury was felt in Texas, where the Plaintiffs reside. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs' claims themselves did not arise out of Lynge's Utah-
related activities. "[S]pecific personal jurisdiction gives a court power over a defendant 
only with respect to claims arising out of the particular activities of the defendant in the 
forum state." Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 
(Utah 1992). Where the claims did not arise out of, or were not related to, Lynge's 
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and Gorm's Utah-related activities, the exercise of specific jurisdiction over those 
parties by the Utah courts is not appropriate. 
Nor does the existence of a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause in 
Gorm's contract with Nu Skin give rise to specific jurisdiction over Gorm and Lynge. 
That clause is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over Gorm for two reasons: 
First, Gorm did not enter into a contract with the Plaintiffs containing a forum 
selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause. Gorm's contract was with Nu Skin. Indeed, 
Gorm's contract with Nu Skin expressly defines the contract as one between Nu Skin 
and a distributor: 
SECTION 1: DEFINITIONS 
* * * 
Contract: The Agreement between a Distributor and Nu Skin Enterprises is 
composed of these Policies and Procedures, the Sales Compensation Plan, 
Distributor Agreement, Partnership/Corporation From and supplemental Sponsor 
Agreements. The Contract is the complete and only Agreement between Nu 
Skin Enterprises and a Distributor. 
By its plain language, the contract is not one between a particular distributor and all of 
Nu Skin's other distributors - it is expressly a contract between Nu Skin and the 
contracting distributor. Gorm, therefore, has consented only to jurisdiction in the Utah 
courts for civil actions arising out of the contract between itself and Nu Skin - Gorm 
did not consent to such jurisdiction for civil actions brought against it by other 
distributors. 
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Second, even if Gorm's contract with Nu is interpreted as consenting to 
jurisdiction in civil actions brought not by Nu but by other distributors, the rational 
nexus requirement of Phone Directories v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 8 P.3d 256, is not 
met in this case. In Phone Directories v. Henderson, the Court instructed that forum 
selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clauses can confer personal jurisdiction so long as 
"there is a rational nexus between the forum selected and/or consented to, and either 
the parties to the contract or the transactions that are the subject matter of the contract." 
2000 UT 64 at if 14. 
Phone Directories v. Henderson involved a breach of contract claim between a 
Utah-based company and a nonresident of Utah. In that case, the plaintiff was a Utah-
based company with its principal place of business in Utah. The defendant telephoned 
the plaintiffs CEO in Utah requesting employment, and telephoned and visited Utah to 
negotiate his employment contract with the plaintiff. 
In this case, while the plaintiff in Phone Directories v. Henderson was a Utah-
based company, neither Plaintiffs nor Gorm are residents of or have any particular 
connection with the forum state, except minimally as one of thousands upon thousands 
of Nu Skin distributors operating throughout the world. While the defendant in Phone 
Directories v. Henderson contacted the plaintiff in Utah and negotiated with the plaintiff 
in Utah, Gorm did not have any contact whatsoever with the Plaintiffs in Utah. Not 
only did Gorm not negotiate a contract in Utah, Gorm did not even have a contract with 
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the Plaintiffs. The connection or nexus with the forum state that existed in Phone 
Directories v. Henderson is clearly absent in this case. 
With respect to Lynge, there is no basis whatsoever to contend that he consented 
to specific personal jurisdiction through a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction 
clause. Not only did Lynge not have a contract with Plaintiffs with such a clause, he 
did not have one with Nu Skin to which Plaintiffs might attempt to bootstrap an 
argument for jurisdiction. 
There is no basis for asserting specific personal jurisdiction over either Lynge or 
Gorm, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
D. Personal Jurisdiction Over Lynge And Gorm Is Not Established Under Gates 
Learjet Corp. v. Jensen. 
In their argument that Defendants consented to specific jurisdiction by signing 
distributorship agreements with Nuskin, Plaintiffs rely solely on a Ninth Circuit 
decision applying Arizona law, presumably as persuasive - not controlling - authority. 
See Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1984). That case is 
materially distinguishable in numerous respects. 
First, unlike in this case, the plaintiff in Gates Learjet was a corporation located 
principally in the forum state. In this case, Plaintiffs, like Defendants, are 
nonresidents. The parties' connection with the forum state in Gates Learjet was clearly 
greater than in this case. 
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Secondly, unlike this case, the plaintiff manufacturer negotiated and entered into 
a contract directly with the nonresident defendants. The defendants even went to 
Arizona to negotiate the contract, which provided that it was an Arizona agreement 
governed by the laws of Arizona. Moreover, the parties negotiated additional airplane 
purchase agreements between themselves that contained a choice of forum clause 
providing that Arizona shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all claims that might 
arise under those agreements. In this case, Plaintiffs rely on an adhesion contract to 
which they are a stranger. There was no negotiation with Nu Skin over the forum 
selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause. Moreover, the plain language of the Nu Skin 
agreement, which should be construed in favor of distributors, does not indicate in any 
way that the Defendants intended the consent-to-jurisdiction clause to apply to a civil 
action involving parties other than Nu Skin.1 
Based on the numerous factors connected with the forum state, including the 
defendants' purposeful interjection into the forum state and the forum state's interest in 
adjudicating the dispute involving one of its residents, the Ninth Circuit held that it was 
reasonable to assert jurisdiction over the defendants. In this case, however, no such 
1
 Nu Skin's Mediation/Arbitration policy, relied upon heavily by Plaintiffs to establish 
that the forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause in the main contract similarly 
applies to civil actions between distributors themselves, even when Nu Skin is not a 
party, is inapposite. This case is a lawsuit filed in district court, and not an arbitration 
action. While Plaintiffs have amended to assert a demand for arbitration, they have 
chosen not to move to compel arbitration, seeking instead to have the courts hear the 
controversy. Indeed, Plaintiffs through counsel expressly acknowledged that they are not 
asserting a claim for arbitration at this time. 
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factors exist. To require these Colorado residents to litigate a civil action in Utah 
brought by residents of Texas, who could have brought the action in Utah,2 is 
unreasonable and would offend traditional notions of fairness and due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellees Lars Lynge and Gorm International Corporation respectfully request 
that the Court affirm the trial court's ruling that they are not subject to personal 
jurisdiction in this action brought by residents of Texas. 
DATED this 15th day of November, 2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
, ffi*^i£^^ 
T^on V. Harper 
Attorneys for Appellees/Defendants 
Lars Lynge and Gorm International Corp. 
2
 Plaintiffs contend that this matter should be litigated in Utah to further the interests of 
Nu Skin. Nu Skin has nothing to do with this case. Once the matter is decided, if Nu 
Skin needs to realign distributors to reflect a judicial decision, that step can be taken, 
regardless of where the litigation is conducted. The remainder of Nu Skin's concerns and 
considerations set forth in Plaintiffs' Brief pertain to its Mediation/Arbitration policy, 
which Plaintiffs have elected not to pursue at this time by electing not to move to compel 
arbitration. 
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Document Date 
Order 01/23/01 
Defendant Lars Lynge's Memorandum in Support of Motion 05/12/00 
to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
Affidavit of Defendant Lars Lynge 05/15/00 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Lars Lynge's 06/08/00 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
Defendant Gorm International's Motion to Dismiss for Lack 05/18/00 
of Personal Jurisdiction 
Affidavit of Guy Humphries in Support of Motion to Dismiss 05/18/00 
for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
Letter to Judge Harding from Edward McBride 06/19/00 
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Jon V. Harper, #1378 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697 
Attorneys for Defendant Lars Lynge 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES WAGNER and JIM WAGNER, 
INC., 
Plaintiffs, ; 
v. , 
NUSKTN INTERNATIONAL CORP., ) 
DENNIS CLIFTON, DAVID CLIFTON, ) 
CLIFTON ASSOC, INC., LARS ) 
LYNGE and GORM INTERNATIONAL ) 
CORP., ) 
Defendants. ) 
) ORDER 
) Civil No. 000400807 
Division jtff ^ 
On Wednesday, November 29, 2000, the Court presided over a hearing on the 
respective motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by Defendant Lars Lynge, 
Defendant Gorm International, and Defendants Dennis Clifton, David Clifton and Clifton 
Associates, Inc. Plaintiffs were represented by Edward T. McBride, Esq.; Defendants Lars 
Lynge and Gorm International were represented by Jon V. Harper, Esq.; and Defendants 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
Dennis Clifton, David Clifton and Clifton Associates, Inc., were represented by Richard W. 
Mitchell, Esq. 
After considering the moving and opposing papers and the arguments of counsel, and 
good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants5 motions to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction are granted, for the reasons set forth in Defendants' respective 
supporting memoranda and during oral argument. 
DATED: 
BY THE COURT: 
The Honorable Gary D. Stott 
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
Edward W? MofijKde, Esq. 
DONALD J.^tJRSER & ASSOC, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
/Jon V. Harper, Esq. f 
(^ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Attorneys for Defendants Lars Lynge and Gorm 
International Corp. 
// £M/ 
Marl: E. HincMey, EstfT 
STOEL RIVES LLP ^ - ^ 
Attorneys for Defendants David Clifton, Dennis 
Clifton and Clifton Associates, Inc. 
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Dennis Clifton, David Clifton and Clifton Associates, Inc., were represented by Richard W. 
Mitchell, Esq. 
After considering the moving and opposing papers and the arguments of counsel, and 
good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' motions to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction are granted, for the reasons set forth in Defendants' respective 
supporting memoranda and during oral argument. 
DATED: 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
Edward W. McBride, Esq. 
DONALD J. PURSER & ASSOC, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
/JanV. Harper, Esq. / 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Attorneys for Defendants Lars Lynge and Gorm 
International Corp. 
The HonorabirQaty D. Stott §• >''.Vr;;-«;:>^v; \ 
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge* .•; :> ',5-NTJ \ \-t 
M*rk E. Himley, Esc(r 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Attorneys for Defendants David Clifton, Dennis 
Clifton and Clifton Associates, Inc. 
2 !5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of 
Anderson & Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that 
on the 26th day of December, 2000, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
[Proposed] Order to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon: 
Donald J. Purser 
Edward W. McBride 
Donald Joseph Purser & Associates, P.C. 
2735 East Parleys Way, Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs James Wagner 
and Jim Wagner, Inc. 
Mark E. Hindley 
Stoel Rives LLP 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
- and -
Richard W. Mitchell 
Norton Lidstone, P.C. 
The Quadrant, Suite 850 
5445 DTC Parkway 
Englewood, Colorado 80111 
Attorneys for Defendants Dennis Clifton, 
David Clifton and Clifton Associates, Inc. 
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Jon V. Harper, #1378 
Shayne R. Kohler, #7913 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697 
Attorneys for Defendant Lars Lynge 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES WAGNER and JIM WAGNER, 
INC., 
Plaintiffs, ; 
V. 
NU SKIN INTERNATIONAL CORP., ] 
DENNIS CLIFTON, DAVID CLD7TON, ; 
CLIFTON ASSOC, INC., LARS ; 
LYNGE and GORM INTERNATIONAL ; 
CORP., ] 
Defendants. ) 
) DEFENDANT LARS LYNGE'S 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
) PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
) Civil No. 000400807 
I Division #6 
Defendant Lars Lynge ("Lynge"), by and through counsel of record, hereby submits 
the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of his motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction. 
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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This is a completely baseless action brought by a disgruntled multi-level marketing 
distributor (Plaintiff Jim Wagner, Inc. ("Wagner")) and its principal participant (Plaintiff 
James Wagner). Plaintiff James Wagner is a resident of Texas. Wagner itself is a Texas 
corporation that does not do business in Utah and is not registered to do business in Utah. 
The action is baseless for a variety of reasons. First, Wagner asserts that it has a 
contract with Defendant Nu Skin International, Inc. ("Nu Skin"). This contract underlies all 
of the claims asserted in the action. The contract is quite clear, however, that any disputes 
arising out of the contractual relationship between Nu Skin and Wagner is subject to a 
mandatory mediation/ arbitration procedure spelled out in the distributor contract. By filing 
this action, Plaintiffs have blatantly disregarded the very contract under which they are suing. 
Second, Plaintiffs assert various breach of contract claims not only against Nu Skin, 
under Wagner's contract with Nu Skin, but also against two other corporate distributors -
Defendant Clifton Associates, Inc. ("Clifton") and Gorm International Corporation ("Gorm"), 
as well as against the individuals who participate in those corporate distributorships. These 
claims are baseless because none of these Defendants has an express or implied contract with 
the Plaintiffs. Moreover, without a contract, there is certainly no covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing to breach, although Plaintiffs assert such a claim against these Defendants. 
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Additionally, Plaintiffs' claims are baseless because the facts simply will not support 
Plaintiffs' legal assertions. In that regard, Plaintiffs complain of Gorm and Lynge moving out 
from under the Wagner distributorship to a new sponsor by acquiring the Clifton 
distributorship. There is no basis for complaint, however. Factually, on or about December 
1, 1996, Gorm terminated its distributorship relationship, and Lynge terminated his role as an 
active participant in the Gorm distributorship. More than a year later, on or about January 9, 
1998, Gorm purchased another distributorship1 - the Clifton distributorship. At that time, 
Lynge once again became an active participant in the Gorm distributorship. Lynge's 
participation in the new distributorship was perfectly appropriate under Nu Skin's policies and 
procedures: "A person listed on the Partnership/Corporation Form of a Corporation . . . 
[Lynge] must wait at least six months after the . . . Corporation has terminated its 
Distributorship before becoming . . . an active participant with a Distributor under a different 
Sponsor." [§ 3(D) of Nu Skin's Policies and Procedures (emphasis added).] That is exactly 
what Lynge did. It had been over 13 months since Lynge had been a "person listed on the 
Partnership/Corporation Form of a Corporation" when he became an active participant in the 
Gorm distributorship that acquired the Clifton distributorship. 
1
 Under the Nu Skin policies and procedures, "a Distributor may dispose of, transfer, or otherwise assign 
his/her Distributorship assets in any manner allowed by applicable law (including sale, gift, or bequest) with the 
prior written consent of the Company, which may not unreasonably be withheld." [§ 3(G) of Nu Skin's Policies 
and Procedures.] 
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Although Plaintiffs' lawsuit eventually will be shown to be baseless and without merit, 
there is no sufficient basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Lynge. Lynge 
is a resident of Colorado. Plaintiffs are residents of Texas. None of the activities of Lynge 
complained of by Plaintiffs took place in Utah, or were directed at any residents of Utah, and 
Plaintiffs' claims, therefore, did not arise out of any Utah-related activities. Moreover, what 
limited contacts Lynge has had with Utah were not sufficiently continuous and systematic such 
that Lynge could be found to be transacting business in the state of Utah. Indeed, any of his 
activities relating to Nu Skin were conducted in his capacity as a principal of the Gorm 
corporation, and activities of an officer or employee of a corporation do not subject the 
individual to personal jurisdiction solely based on those activities. 
The Complaint against Lynge, therefore, must be dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff James Wagner is an individual residing in the state of Texas (f 1 of 
Complaint). 
2. Plaintiff Jim Wagner, Inc. ("Wagner"), is a Texas corporation (t 2 of 
Complaint). Wagner is not registered to do business in the state of Utah (Affidavit of Lars 
Lynge at f 2, attached hereto as Exhibit "A")2. 
2
 At the time of filing, Mr. Lynge is traveling. The original signature page will be filed and served upon 
execution. 
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3. As Plaintiffs allege, at all times relevant to the Complaint, Lynge was and is an 
individual residing in Colorado (f 5 of Complaint; Affidavit of Lars Lynge at f 3). 
4. Lynge does not transact any business within the state of Utah, nor do Plaintiffs 
allege in the Complaint that he transacts any business within the state of Utah (Affidavit of 
Lars Lynge at if 4; see Complaint). 
5. Lynge has not caused any injury within the state of Utah, whether tortious or by 
breach of warranty, nor do Plaintiffs allege that he has caused any such injury in this state 
(Affidavit of Lars Lynge at f 5; see Complaint). 
6. From March 20, 1996, until December 1, 1996, Lynge was a "Principal 
Partner" in, and was listed on the Partnership/Corporation Form of the Gorm distributorship. 
As of December 1, 1996, Lynge voluntarily terminated his role in the Gorm distributorship, 
when it became apparent to Lynge that Nu Skin was not going to commence operations in his 
native country of Denmark in the foreseeable future. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at f 6.) 
7. On January 7, 1998, Gorm purchased the Nu Skin downline of Defendant 
Clifton Associates, Inc. ("Clifton"). On January 9, 1998, Lynge again became the "Principal 
Partner" in Gorm's new corporate distributorship with Nu Skin. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at t 
8. As of June 30, 1998, Lynge removed himself as "Principal Partner" of the 
Gorm distributorship and terminated his formal individual role in that corporate distributorship 
(Affidavit of Lars Lynge at 1 8). 
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9. Lynge's only contacts with the state of Utah have been in his capacity as an 
officer or employee of Gorm, which operated a corporate Nu Skin distributorship. Those 
contacts have consisted only of attending two Nu Skin company-wide conventions in Utah (in 
1996 and 1998) and discussing with Nu Skin officials their plans for opening countries in 
Europe. Lynge has not had a place of business in Utah, has not recruited prospective 
distributors residing in Utah, has not been licensed to do business in Utah, has not placed 
advertisements in Utah, has not sent direct mailings into Utah, has not maintained a website 
accessible to residents of Utah, has not sold product into Utah, has not generated any business 
volume from Utah, and has not conducted or participated in any opportunity or sales meetings 
in Utah. He has never had any dealings of any kind with the Plaintiffs in the state of Utah. 
He was recruited to participate in Nu Skin in his resident state of Colorado, and his activities 
relating to Nu Skin have been conducted almost entirely from his home and office in Colorado 
and in Europe. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at If 9.) 
10. Any contacts Lynge has had with Defendant Dennis Clifton ("Dennis Clifton"), 
also a resident of Colorado, took place outside of the state of Utah. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at 
1 9 . ) 
11. All of the tortious conduct in which Plaintiffs allege Lynge has engaged took 
place outside of the state of Utah, and any of the alleged injury complained of from that 
alleged conduct was felt in Texas - not in Utah - where the two Plaintiffs reside. (Affidavit of 
Lars Lynge at H 10.) 
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12. Lynge does not have, nor has he ever had, any contractual relationship with 
either Plaintiff. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at 1 11.) 
13. Any of the conduct or activities giving rise to Plaintiffs' allegations against 
Lynge for breach of contract took place outside of the state of Utah, and the activities alleged 
by Plaintiffs affected Plaintiffs in Texas and did not affect any persons or businesses within the 
state of Utah. (Affidavit of Lars Lynge at t 13.) 
ARGUMENT 
A. General Principles of Utah Law Governing the Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction 
over Non-Resident Defendants. 
The exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants by a Utah court must 
comply with the Utah long-arm statute as well as constitutional due process requirements. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (1998) provides as follows: 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, 
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or 
through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, 
submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, 
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim 
arising out of or related to: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether 
tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate 
situated in this state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk 
located within this state at the time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate 
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in the marital 
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relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent 
departure from the state; or the commission in this state of the 
act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a mere 
omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the 
defendant had no control; or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state 
which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 
45a, to determine paternity for the purpose of establishing 
responsibility for child support. 
None of Plaintiffs' claims arise out of or relate to any of the enumerated bases under the 
statute. 
Utah law recognizes two types of personal jurisdiction over non-residents: specific and 
general. A court may exercise specific jurisdiction if a non-resident defendant has 
purposefully directed his activities at residents in Utah and the litigation results from claims 
that arise out of, or relate to, those activities. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (1998); see also 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 
(1985); Haas v. A.M. King Industries, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 644, 647 (D. Utah 1998). A Utah 
court may exercise general jurisdiction where the non-resident defendant's contacts with Utah 
rise to the level of being "continuous and systematic." See Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia S.A. v. Hall 466 U.S. 408, 416, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984). 
To satisfy constitutional due process requirements, Lynge must have had "certain 
minimum contacts with [Utah] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 316 (1945). 
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In this case, Lynge has not purposefully directed any activities at any residents of the 
forum state, and, even if there were such activities, the claims asserted in this litigation do not 
arise out of or relate to any such activities. Additionally, Lynge's contacts with Utah do not 
rise anywhere near the level of being continuous and systematic, and have been so minimal that 
the exercise of jurisdiction over him by Utah courts would offend traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice. Moreover, such contacts were in his capacity as a principal of the 
Gorm corporation, which contacts do not subject him to personal jurisdiction. See Segil v. 
Gloria Marshall Management Co., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 915, 918 (D. Utah 1983) (citing 
Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 1969)). The exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over Lynge, therefore, would violate both Utah's long-arm statute and 
constitutional due process requirements. 
B. Lynge's contacts with Utah are inadequate to establish specific jurisdiction because 
the claims in this lawsuit did not arise out of and were not related to Lynge's Utah-
related activities. 
None of the conduct complained of by Plaintiffs in this action took place in Utah or was 
directed at any resident of Utah. That alleged conduct essentially consists of the Clifton 
Defendants, Gorm and Lynge working to move the downline of the Gorm distributorship from 
under the sponsorship of Plaintiffs to the sponsorship of the downline of Clifton. More 
specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Lynge resigned from the Gorm distributorship but remained 
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active as a Nu Skin distributor without waiting at least six months before becoming an active 
participant in a new distributorship under a different sponsor.3 
Plaintiffs contend that the alleged conduct described above was directed at them - that 
Lynge was trying to steal the Gorm downline from Plaintiffs and improperly move that 
downline under a new sponsor (see Complaint at t 53). Plaintiff James Wagner was a resident 
of Texas, and Wagner was a Texas corporation, not doing business or authorized to do 
business in Utah. Thus, the conduct out of which the claims in this lawsuit arose was not 
directed at any resident of the forum state — Utah. Moreover, the alleged conduct itself 
consisted of action taken by Lynge entirely outside of Utah, the adverse effects of which (if 
there were any such effects) were felt in Texas, not in Utah. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs' claims did not arise out of Lynge's Utah-related activities. 
"[S]pecific personal jurisdiction gives a court power over a defendant only with respect to 
claims arising out of the particular activities of the defendant in the forum state." Arguello v. 
Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992). Where the claims did 
not arise out of, or were not related to, Lynge's Utah-related activities, the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction over Lynge by the Utah courts is not appropriate. See id-; Utah Code Ann. § 78-
27-24(1998). 
3
 As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Lynge did not violate Nu Skin's policies and procedures 
regarding a six-month period of inactivity. As a person listed on the Partnership/Corporation Form for Gorm, 
Lynge waited more than 13 months before he became an active participant in the new Gorm distributorship that 
acquired the Clifton distributorship - the conduct that Plaintiffs claim caused them damage. 
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C. Lynge's contacts with Utah are inadequate to establish general jurisdiction because 
Lvnge's contacts with Utah do not rise to the level of "continuous and systematic". 
Lynge's general business contacts with Utah are not sufficient to support a finding of 
general jurisdiction. Those contacts have not been systematic and continuous. Moreover, his 
business contacts have been in the context of his role as a principal of a corporation, which 
conduct on behalf of a corporation does not subject a non-resident individual to the jurisdiction 
of the foreign state. See Segil v. Gloria Marshall Management Co., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 915, 
918 (D. Utah 1983) (citing Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 1969)). 
Indeed, Lynge's contacts with Utah - attending a couple of company-wide conventions 
and taking a short tour of Nu Skin's headquarters - are far less systematic and continuous then 
those of the defendant corporation in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 
U.S. 408, 416, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984). In that case, the United States 
Supreme Court found that Texas did not have general jurisdiction over a Colombian 
corporation. The Colombian company had sent its chief executive officer to Texas for one 
contract negotiation session, accepted checks drawn on a Texas bank, purchased helicopters, 
equipment and training services from a Texas company, and sent personnel to Texas for 
training. Noting that the defendant corporation did not have a place of business in Texas and 
was not licensed to do business there, the court found that the defendant's contacts with Texas 
could not be described or regarded as "continuous and systematic" in nature. Id. at 416-17. 
Additionally, Lynge's contacts are far less than those of other defendants over whom 
courts have declined to exercise general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Harnischfeger Eng'rs v. 
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Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 608, 612 (D. Utah 1995) (defendant's sales in Utah 
amounted to one-tenth of one percent of the defendant's total business nationwide). Lynge has 
not sold any product in Utah. There is simply no basis to find that the exercise of general 
jurisdiction is appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Lynge's contacts with the state of Utah are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
either specific or general jurisdiction. Accordingly, Lynge's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Personal Jurisdiction should be granted. 
DATED: May 12, 2000. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
JonV. 
Shayne tf. Kohler 
Attorney for Defendant Lars Lynge 
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Martin R. Denney 
Callister, Nebeker & McCullough 
10 East South Temple, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for Defendant Nu Skin 
International Corp. 
Mark E. Hindley 
Stoel Rives LLP 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants Dennis Clifton, 
David Clifton and Clifton Associates, 
Inc. 
Guy B. Humphries 
Attorney at Law 
1700 Broadway, Suite 1800 
Denver, Colorado 80290 
Attorney for Gorm International 
Corporation 
icdcflg/s <mi 'Jifr-
13 lil 
Tab 3 
Jon V. Harper, #1378 
Shayne R. Kohler, #7913 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
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Attorneys for Defendant Lars Lynge 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES WAGNER and JIM WAGNER, 
INC., 
Plaintiffs, ; 
v. 
NUSKIN INTERNATIONAL CORP., ] DENNIS CLD7TON, DAVJJD CLD7TON, ] 
CLD7TON ASSOC, INC., LARS ] 
LYNGE and GORM INTERNATIONAL ; 
CORP., } 
Defendants. ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
) LARS LYNGE 
) Civil No. 000400807 
I Division #6 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON ) 
LARS LYNGE, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
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1. I am a named Defendant in the above-captioned matter. I have personal 
knowledge of all facts contained in this Affidavit and, if called to testify, would do so 
consistently herewith. 
2. Based on my inquiry with the Division of Corporations for the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff Jim Wagner, Inc. is not registered to do business in the state of Utah. 
3. I am an individual residing in the state of Colorado. 
4. I do not transact any business within the state of Utah. 
5. I have not caused any injury within the state of Utah, whether tortious or by 
breach of warranty. 
6. Between March 20, 1996, until December 1, 1996, I was a "Principal Partner" 
in and listed on the Partnership/Corporation Form of the corporate distributorship that 
Defendant Gorm International Corporation ("Gorm International") had with Defendant Nu 
Skin International, Inc. ("Nu Skin"). As of December 1, 1996, I voluntarily terminated my 
role in the Gorm International distributorship, when it became apparent that Nu Skin was not 
going to commence operations in my native country of Denmark for the foreseeable future. 
7. On January 7, 1998, Gorm International purchased the Nu Skin downline of 
Clifton Associates, Inc. On January 9, 1998, I once again was listed on the 
Partnership/Corporation Form accompanying Gorm International's new corporate 
distributorship application with Nu Skin. 
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8. As of June 30, 1998, I removed myself from the Gorm International 
distributorship and terminated my formal individual role in that corporate distributorship. 
9. My only contacts with the state of Utah have been in my capacity as an officer 
or employee of Gorm International, which operated a corporate Nu Skin distributorship. 
Those contacts have consisted only of attending two Nu Skin company-wide conventions in 
Utah (in 1996 and 1998) and discussing with Nu Skin officials their plans for opening countries 
in Europe. I have not had a place of business in Utah, have not recruited prospective 
distributors residing in Utah, have not been licensed to do business in Utah, have not placed 
advertisements in Utah, have not sent direct mailings into Utah, have not maintained a website 
accessible to residents of Utah, have not sold product into Utah, have not generated any 
business volume from Utah, and I have not conducted or participated in any opportunity or 
sales meetings in Utah. I have never had any dealings of any kind with the Plaintiffs in the 
state of Utah. I was recruited to participate in Nu Skin in my resident state of Colorado, and 
my activities relating to Nu Skin have been conducted almost entirely from my home and office 
in Colorado and in Europe. 
10. All of the tortious conduct in which Plaintiffs allege I have engaged took place 
outside of the state of Utah, and any of the alleged injury complained of from that alleged 
conduct was felt in Texas - not in Utah - where the two Plaintiffs reside. 
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11. I do not have, and have never had, any contractual relationship with either 
Plaintiff. 
12. Any of the conduct or activities giving rise to Plaintiffs' allegations against me 
for breach of contract took place outside of the state of Utah, and the activities alleged by 
Plaintiffs affected Plaintiffs in Texas and did not affect any persons or businesses within the 
state of Utah. 
DATED: O S - 1 ^ , 2000. 
LARS LYNGE 
lAr— 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a notary public, on the / 6 day of May, 
2000, by Lars Lynge. 
\9\ Z /-£ 
My Commission Expires: 
My Commission Expires 
w y
 5-25-00 
" • ' « . . . , . . • • » » " 
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697 
Attorneys for Defendant Lars Lynge 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES WAGNER and JIM WAGNER, 
INC., ; 
Plaintiffs, ; 
v. , 
NUSKIN INTERNATIONAL CORP., ] DENNIS CLIFTON, DAVID CLIFTON, ] 
CLIFTON ASSOC, INC., LARS ; 
LYNGE and GORM INTERNATIONAL ] 
CORP., : 
Defendants. ) 
) REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF DEFENDANT LARS LYNGE'S 
) MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
) PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
) Civil No. 000400807 
) Division #6 
Defendant Lars Lynge ("Lynge"), by and through counsel, hereby submits the 
following reply memorandum in support of Defendant Lars Lynge's Motion to Dismiss for 
r?z 
Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Lynge has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In his motion, 
Lynge contends that the activity complained of by Plaintiffs against him did not arise out of 
any Utah-related activities, and that Lynge's limited contacts with the state of Utah were not 
sufficiently continuous and systematic such that Lynge could be found to be transacting 
business in the state of Utah. 
With respect to Lynge's motion, Plaintiffs apparently do not dispute Lynge's contention 
that the Court does not have specific jurisdiction over Lynge, i.e., that Lynge has not 
purposefully directed his activities at residents in Utah and that this litigation does not result 
from claims that arise out of or relate to Lynge's activities in Utah. See Memorandum in 
Opposition at p. 5. Plaintiffs, however, contend that the Court has general jurisdiction over 
Lynge based on defendant Gorm International's alleged consent to jurisdiction, and Lynge's 
status as Principal Partner of Gorm International. As discussed in greater detail herein below, 
any consent of Gorm International was not binding on Lynge, and certainly is not binding on 
Lynge when Lynge is not a Principal Partner of that distributorship. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that Lynge submitted a false and misleading affidavit 
designed to deceive the Court and seek sanctions against him under Rule 11. First, Lynge did 
not state in his affidavit that he did not consent to jurisdiction in Utah. That assertion is 
1
 Inasmuch as Plaintiffs improperly combined their memorandum in opposition to Lynge's motion to dismiss with 
their memorandum in support of their motion for sanctions under Rule 11, this reply memorandum should also be 
deemed to serve as Lynge's memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions. See Section B of this 
memorandum, infra. 
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abselutelv false. Secondly, Plaintiffs have blatantly violated the 21-day safe harbor provision 
of Rule 11 and the requirement that a motion under Rule 11 must be made separately from 
other motions. Plaintiffs, in an obvious underhanded attempt to prejudice and improperly 
influence the Court in connection with the motion to dismiss, combined their memorandum in 
opposition to the motion to dismiss with a memorandum in support of their Rule 11 motion. 
Not only should the Court strike the Rule 11 motion and the portion of the Memorandum in 
Opposition dealing with the Rule 11 motion, but the Court should also award Lynge his 
attorney fees incurred in opposing the improperly filed and baseless motion. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
A. Any Consent to Jurisdiction on the Part of Gorm International Is Not Binding 
upon Lynge. 
Plaintiffs assert that Gorm International, through its distributorship agreement with Nu 
Skin, has consented to submit to the jurisdiction of Utah courts for resolution of this litigation.2 
While Lynge and his counsel do not speak in this litigation for Gorm International, it is 
certainly appropriate for Lynge to comment on this allegation since Plaintiffs base their 
2
 Plaintiffs do not submit any admissible evidence to support this assertion. Plaintiffs have submitted the Affidavit 
of James Wagner in support of their Memorandum in Opposition. The statements in that affidavit dealing with 
Gorm International and Lynge, however, are not based on admissible personal knowledge, but on inadmissible 
opinions, legal conclusions and hearsay testimony. The Court should strike such testimony. For example, Mr. 
Wagner states, '7/ is my understanding that Gorm International Corp. is and/or was an independent distributor of 
Nu Skin products and, as such, has voluntarily subjected itself to jurisdiction in the State of Utah." See paragraph 5 
of Affidavit of James Wagner. Mr. Wagner does not have any personal knowledge to support that assertion. 
Additionally, he states, "It is my understanding that both David Clifton and Lars Lynge were principal partners of 
Nu Skin distributors Clifton Associates and Gorm International " Again, he does not have personal knowledge of 
that assertion. He even admits that it is merely his "understanding." He goes on to assert the following inadmissible 
legal conclusion: "the defendants hcn>e clearly subjected themselves to the laws of the State of Utah. " All of those 
statements should be stricken. 
3 
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assertion that the Court may assert general jurisdiction over Lynge on their allegation that 
Gorm International has agreed to submit to jurisdiction in Utah. 
Any distributorship agreement between Gorm International and Nu Skin is simply 
between those two parties. If Gorm International has agreed in that agreement to submit to the 
jurisdiction of Utah courts, that agreement is simply between those two parties. The most that 
can be drawn from that agreement, therefore, is that Gorm International has agreed to submit 
to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts in litigation between Nu Skin and Gorm International. It 
does not follow that Gorm International has agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of Utah courts 
in any litigation between itself and any other party, such as the Plaintiffs - particularly when 
Nu Skin is not even participating in this litigation.3 There is no allegation in this case that 
Gorm International has a contract with the Plaintiffs in which Gorm International has agreed to 
submit to the jurisdiction of Utah courts in litigation between them. 
Even if Gorm International has an agreement with Nu Skin to submit to the jurisdiction 
of Utah courts that somehow extends to litigation between the Plaintiffs and Gorm 
International, Lynge does not have any such agreement, nor do Plaintiffs assert that there is 
any such agreement. Lynge himself has not agreed with anyone to submit to the jurisdiction of 
the Utah courts. 
3
 Plaintiffs state in their Memorandum in Opposition that they have stipulated with Nu Skin to arbitrate their claims 
rather than participate in this litigation. See Memorandum in Opposition at p. 2. 
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Moreover, there is no legal basis, and none has been cited by Plaintiffs, to bind Lynge 
to an agreement between the corporate entity Gorm and Nu Skin. Indeed, by way of analogy, 
corporate officers are not bound by a contract made in the name of a corporation, and no 
personal liability is incurred. See generally 18B Am Jur 2d Corporations, §§ 1840 and 1841 
(1985). 
Plaintiffs apparently contend that Lynge is subject to Gorm International's alleged 
agreement with Nu Skin to submit to the jurisdiction of Utah courts in disputes arising under 
Gorm International's distributorship agreement with Nu Skin on the basis of his status as 
"Principal Partner" of that distributorship. Plaintiffs cite Segil v. Gloria Marshall 
Management Co., 568 F. Supp. 915 (D. Utah 1983) in support of that position. There are at 
least two reasons why Plaintiffs' contention in this regard is wrong. 
First, Lynge was only listed as the Principal Partner during two discrete time frames -
from March 20, 1996 to December 1, 1996, and from January 9, 1998 to June 30, 1998. (See 
Affidavit of Lars Lynge at f f 7 and 8, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). Lynge has not been 
the Principal Partner in the Gorm International distributorship for nearly two years. (Id.) 
Even assuming that Lynge was bound as the Principal Partner by Gorm International's alleged 
agreement to submit to jurisdiction in Utah (which Lynge disputes), he was no longer the 
Principal Partner of that distributorship when this action was commenced and therefore is no 
longer bound to any such agreement. Moreover, the conduct of Lynge complained of by 
Plaintiffs in the Complaint herein took place during 1997, at a time when Lynge was not a 
5 
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Principal Partner in the Gorm International distributorship. See, e.g.. Complaint at ff 51, 55-
60, 67 and 70. 
Secondly, Segil v. Gloria Marshall Management Co., supra, does not stand for the 
proposition that a nonresident individual who was once a Principal Partner in a corporate 
distributorship is bound, and continues to be bound even after he is no longer a Principal 
Partner, by the corporation's agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign state. In 
Segil, two corporations clearly were doing substantial and continuous business in Utah and 
were subject to the general jurisdiction of Utah. Indeed, the corporations supervised and/or 
operated seven salons in Utah. The sole shareholder of those corporations, who also was an 
officer and a director of the corporations, contended that her activities within Utah were all 
conducted on behalf of the corporations and therefore she herself was not subject to the general 
jurisdiction of that state under the fiduciary shield doctrine. Under that doctrine, an officer or 
employee of a corporation may not be subject to the personal jurisdiction of a state solely on 
the basis of her activities in that state on behalf of the corporation which subject the 
corporation to the jurisdiction of the state. The issue in Segil, therefore, was whether the 
individual should be protected by the fiduciary shield doctrine under the circumstances of that 
case. 
In this case, the corporation (Gorm International) does not have substantial and 
continuous business contacts with the state of Utah. Indeed, Plaintiffs contend only that the 
basis for general jurisdiction is the distributorship agreement that Gorm allegedly signed with 
Nu Skin agreeing to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Utah. This Court, therefore, is 
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not presented with the question of whether Lynge's activities on behalf of the corporation 
should subject him to the general jurisdiction of Utah courts, but, rather, with the question 
whether Lynge personally is bound by Gorm's alleged consent to jurisdiction. As discussed 
above, there is no basis for extending such an agreement to Lynge personally, particularly 
when he is not currently the Principal Partner of Gorm International and has not been so for 
two years. 
Other than to try to establish general jurisdiction over Lynge through Gorm's alleged 
consent to jurisdiction, Plaintiffs do not dispute Lynge's points and authorities in support of his 
motion to dismiss. Since Lynge is not bound by any alleged consent of Gorm International, 
Lynge's motion should be granted. 
B. Lynge Has Not Violated Rule 11, and In Requesting Sanctions Against Lvnge, 
Plaintiffs Have Blatantly Disregarded the Requirements of Rule 11. 
Plaintiffs baselessly contend that Lynge submitted a false affidavit stating that he has 
not consented to jurisdiction in Utah, and therefore Lynge should be sanctioned pursuant to a 
Rule 11 motion. The contention is completely false, as a review of Mr. Lynge's affidavit will 
demonstrate. (A copy of the affidavit is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" for the convenience of 
the Court.) On that basis alone, the motion for sanctions should be denied. 
The motion for sanctions should also be denied because Lynge's motion to dismiss is 
not being presented for an improper purpose, and the legal contentions therein are not 
frivolous. As discussed in the preceding section of this memorandum, Lynge personally did 
not agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts and vigorously disputes that he is 
bound by Gorm International's alleged agreement in that regard. Lynge's legal contention that 
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he is not subject to the general jurisdiction of the Utah courts is not "plainly foreclosed by 
well-established legal principles and authoritative precedent." See 2 Moore ys Federal Practice, 
§ 11.11 [7][a] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). If it were, Plaintiffs surely would have cited such 
well-established legal principles and authoritative precedent in their memorandum. Plaintiffs, 
however, cited only one case, which does not apply to the facts of this case or to the 
proposition espoused by Plaintiffs. If a motion filed in this case thus far has violated Rule 11, 
it is Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Lynge. 
Finally, even if there were merit to Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions against Lynge -
which there is not - the motion should be denied solely on the basis that Plaintiffs have 
blatantly violated the requirements of that rule. Rule 11(c)(1)(A) provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other 
motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate 
subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed 
with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion 
(or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, 
defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately 
corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the 
motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or 
opposing the motion.... 
(Emphasis added). In this case, Plaintiffs have served and filed4 their motion for sanctions 
concurrently, without providing Lynge the 21-day "safe harbor" period mandated by the rule. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs have combined their memorandum in support of their motion for 
4
 Attached as Exhibit "B" hereto is a printout of the docket for this case that shows the Motion for Rule 11 
Sanctions was filed on May 30, 2000. The certificate of service indicates that the motion was mailed on May 26, 
2000. 
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sanctions with their opposition to Lynge's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
which is also prohibited by Rule 11. The motion, therefore, should be denied and, indeed, 
should be stricken. See, e.g., Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1995)(failure to comply 
with "safe harbor" provision precluded imposition of sanctions); Hadges v. Yonkers Racing 
Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1323, 1328 (2nd Cir. 1995)("no evidence in the record indicating that 
YRC served Hadges with the request for sanctions 21 days before presenting it to the court," 
sanctions also improper because request for them was part of motion to dismiss); Omega 
Sports, Inc. v. Sunkvong America, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 201, 203 (E.D. Pa. 1995)(request for 
sanctions denied because party failed to serve 21 days before filing; request also improper 
because included in motion for remand); and Glutzer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 183 
F.R.D. 632, 639 (WD. 111. 1999)(request for sanctions did not meet requirements for Rule 11 
motion because it was not made separately from any other motion). 
Additionally, the Court should award Lynge his attorney fees incurred in connection 
with opposing this motion. See Rule 11(c)(1)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("the 
court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney 
fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion"). 
DATED: June 8, 2000. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
/ Jpfi V. Harper 
^Attorney for Defendant Lars Lynge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of 
Anderson & Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that 
on the 8th day of June, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served, 
via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon: 
Donald J. Purser 
Edward W. McBride 
Donald Joseph Purser & Associates, P.C. 
2735 East Parleys Way, Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs James Wagner 
and Jim Wagner, Inc. 
Martin R. Denney 
Callister, Nebeker & McCuIlough 
10 East South Temple, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for Defendant NuSkin 
International Corp. 
Mark E. Hindley 
Stoel Rives LLP 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants Dennis Clifton, 
David Clifton and Clifton Associates, 
Inc. 
Guy B. Humphries 
Attorney at Law 
1700 Broadway, Suite 1800 
Denver, Colorado 80290 
Attorney for Defendant Gorm 
International Corporation 
MWfmufir-
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Jon V. Harper, #1378 
Shayne R. Kohler, #7913 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697 
Attorneys for Defendant Lars Lynge 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES WAGNER and JIM WAGNER, 
INC., 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v. 
NUSKTN INTERNATIONAL CORP., ] DENNIS CLIFTON, DAVID CLIFTON, ] 
CLIFTON ASSOC, INC., LARS ] 
LYNGE and GORM INTERNATIONAL ) 
CORP., ) 
Defendants. ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
) LARSLYNGE 
) Civil No. 000400807 
Division #6 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON ) 
LARS LYNGE, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a named Defendant in the above-captioned matter. I have personal 
knowledge of all facts contained in this Affidavit and, if called to testify, would do so 
consistently herewith. 
2. Based on my inquiry with the Division of Corporations for the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff Jim Wagner, Inc. is not registered to do business in the state of Utah. 
3. I am an individual residing in the state of Colorado. 
4. I do not transact any business within the state of Utah. 
5. I have not caused any injury within the state of Utah, whether tortious or by 
breach of warranty. 
6. Between March 20, 1996, until December 1, 1996, I was a "Principal Partner" 
in and listed on the Partnership/Corporation Form of the corporate distributorship that 
Defendant Gorm International Corporation ("Gorm International") had with Defendant Nu 
Skin International, Inc. ("Nu Skin"). As of December 1, 1996, I voluntarily terminated my 
role in the Gorm International distributorship, when it became apparent that Nu Skin was not 
going to commence operations in my native country of Denmark for the foreseeable future. 
7. On January 7, 1998, Gorm International purchased the Nu Skin downline of 
Clifton Associates, Inc. On January 9, 1998, I once again was listed on the 
Partnership/Corporation Form accompanying Gorm International's new corporate 
distributorship application with Nu Skin. 
2 165 
8. As of June 30, 1998, I removed myself from the Gorm International 
distributorship and terminated my formal individual role in that corporate distributorship. 
9. My only contacts with the state of Utah have been in my capacity as an officer 
or employee of Gorm International, which operated a corporate Nu Skin distributorship. 
Those contacts have consisted only of attending two Nu Skin company-wide conventions in 
Utah (in 1996 and 1998) and discussing with Nu Skin officials their plans for opening countries 
in Europe. I have not had a place of business in Utah, have not recruited prospective 
distributors residing in Utah, have not been licensed to do business in Utah, have not placed 
advertisements in Utah, have not sent direct mailings into Utah, have not maintained a website 
accessible to residents of Utah, have not sold product into Utah, have not generated any 
business volume from Utah, and I have not conducted or participated in any opportunity or 
sales meetings in Utah. I have never had any dealings of any kind with the Plaintiffs in the 
state of Utah. I was recruited to participate in Nu Skin in my resident state of Colorado, and 
my activities relating to Nu Skin have been conducted almost entirely from my home and office 
in Colorado and in Europe. 
10. All of the tortious conduct in which Plaintiffs allege I have engaged took place 
outside of the state of Utah, and any of the alleged injury complained of from that alleged 
conduct was felt in Texas - not in Utah - where the two Plaintiffs reside. 
3 
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11. I do not have, and have never had, any contractual relationship with either 
Plaintiff. 
12. Any of the conduct or activities giving rise to Plaintiffs1 allegations against me 
for breach of contract took place outside of the state of Utah, and the activities alleged by 
Plaintiffs affected Plaintiffs in Texas and did not affect any persons or businesses within the 
state of Utah. 
DATED: o ^ - 1^ , 2000. 
LARS LYNGE 
U N -
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me. a notary public, on the / 6 day of May, 
2000. by Lars Lynge. 
My Commission Expires: 
MvComm.ss.on Expires 
Wy
 5-25-0° 
.....••...:>x /O, ' 
V^v-. • Notary Public 
" ' ' ' ' • M M I H H 1 " 
AVW?/UCH , (£o0^uicX . 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES WAGNER vs. GORM INTERNATIONAL CORP 
CASE NUMBER 0004 00807 Contracts 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
PAY HARDING, JR. 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - JAMES WAGNER 
Roanoke, TX 7 6262 
Represented by: DONALD J. PURSER 
Represented by: EDWARD MCBRIDE 
Plaintiff - JIM WAGNER INC 
Represented by: DONALD J. PURSER 
Defendant - NUSKIN INTERNATIONAL CORP 
Provo, UT 84601-4483 
Defendant - DENNIS CLIFTON 
Denver, CO 80209 
Defendant - DAVID CLIFTON 
Austin, TX 7874 6 
Defendant - CLIFTON ASSOCIATES INC 
Defendant - LARS LYNGE 
Indian Hills, CO 804 54 
Defendant - GORM INTERNATIONAL CORP 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 17 0.00 
Amount Paid: 170.00 
Credit: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL.- TYPE: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE 
Amount Due: 120.00 
Amount Paid: 120.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
Printed: 06/02/00 14:34:53 
AL 
CASE NUMBER 0004 00807 Contracts 
Page 1 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
CASE NOTE 
50.00 
50.00 
0.00 
PROCEEDINGS 
02-25-00 Case filed by jerir 
02-25-00 Filed: Complaint 
02-25-00 Filed: Demand Civil Jury 
02-29-00 Judge HARDING, JR. assigned. 
02-2 9-00 Fee Account created Total Due: 
02-29-00 Fee Account created Total Due: 
02-29-00 COMPLAINT 10K-MORE Payment Received: 
120.00 
50.00 
120.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE; Code 
Description: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL; Mail Payment; 
02-29-00 JURY DEMAND - CIVIL Payment Received: 50.00 
03-2 9-00 Filed: Defendant Nu Skin International Corporation's Motion 
Dismiss Complaint and Compel Arbitration and For Attorney's 
Fees 
03-2 9-00 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Nu Skin 
International's Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Compel 
Arbitration and For Attorney's Fees 
04-10-00 Filed return: Summons (out of state) 
Party Served: LYNGE, LARS 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: March 20, 2000 
04-10-00 Filed return: Summons (out of state) 
to 
Party Served 
Service Type 
Service Date 
04-10-00 Filed return: Summons 
CLIFTON, DAVID 
Personal 
March 21, 2000 
jerir 
jerir 
jerir 
jerir 
jerir 
jerir 
jerir 
jerir 
jeanj 
jeanj 
jeanj 
jeanj 
jeanj 
Party Served: NUSKIN INTERNATIONAL CORP • 
Service Type: NonPersonai 
Service Date: March 09, 2000 
04-24-00 Filed: Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Nu 
Skin International Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Complaint 
and Compel Arbitration and for Attorney's Fees jeanj 
04-28-00 Filed: Motion and Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal With 
Prejudice jeanj 
04-26-00 Filed: Notice to Submit jeanj 
05-01-00 Filed order: Order on Motion and Stipulation for Voluntary 
Dismissal with Prejudice jeanj 
Judge rhardijr 
Printed: 06/02/00 14:34:53 Page 
AL 
CASE NUMBER 0004 00807 Contracts 
Signed May 01, 2000 
05-12-00 Filed: Defendants Dennis Clifton, David Clifton, and Clifton 
Associates, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rules 12(b) (2) 
and 17(a) jeanj 
05-12-00 Filed: Defendants Dennis Clifton, David Clifton, and Clifton 
Associates, Inc.'s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2) and 17(a) jeanj 
05-15-00 Filed: Defendant Lars Lynge's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Personal Jurisdiction jeanj 
05-15-00 Filed: Defendant Lars Lynge's Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction jeanj 
05-18-00 Filed: Notice of Filing Affidavit of Lars Lynge jeanj 
05-19-00 Filed: Defendant Gorm International's Motion to Dismiss for 
Lack' of Personal Jurisdiction jeanj 
05-30-00 Filed: Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions jeanj 
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Sanctions jeanj 
05-30-00 Filed: Affidavit of James Wagner jeanj 

Guy Humphries 
1700 Broadway, Suite 1800 
Denver, CO 80290 
Telephone: (303)832-002 9 
Facsimile: (3 03)8 32-002 9 
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RECEIVER FOR GORM
 I N T E R N A T I 0NAL 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES WAGNER and JIM WAGNER, 
INC , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
NUSKIN
 I N T E R M A T I O N A L CORP., 
DENNIS CLIFTON, DAVID CLIFTON, 
CLIFTON ASSOC. INC., LARS 
LYNGE and GORM INTERNATIONA 
CORP., 
Defendants 
DEFENDANT GORM INTERNATIONAL'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
0400807 
Division fo 
Defendant Gorm international Corp. ("Gorm"), a Colorado 
Corporation, moves, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to dismiss this action for lack of personal 
jurisdiction over it. As grounds therefore, Gorm states as follows: 
1. Gorm incorporates herein the grounds for dismissal set 
forth in the Motions to Dismiss and supporting Memoranda filed by 
Defendant Lars Lynge and by Defendants Dennis Clifton, David 
Clifton and Clifton Associates, Inc. 
2. Gorm was a Colorado corporation which, on June 18, 1998, 
changed its name to Pronet International, Inc. [Humphries Aff. f4] 
3 - As set forth in the Motion to Dismiss and supporting 
documents filed by Defendant Lynge, Lynge was the "Principal 
Partner" of Gorm. Gorm's only contacts with the Utah forum have 
been through its agent Lynge and are as set forth in f9 of the 
Lynge Affidavit. [Humphries Aff. f5] 
13 
4. Gorm's limited contacts with the Utah forum through Lynge 
are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over it. 
WHEREFORE, for the above stated reasons, and the reasons set 
forth in the Motions to Dismiss and supporting Memoranda filed by 
Defendant Lars Lynge and by Defendants Dennis Clifton, David 
Clifton and Clifton Associates, Inc., which are incorporated 
herein, Gorm requests that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED: May 18, 2000 
y^m^— 
Giitf' fitimphriefcf) Colo. Reg. #10541 
1700 Broadway, Suite 1800 
Denver, Colorado 80290 
(303) 832-0029 
RECEIVER FOR GORM INTERNATIONAL 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /jr day of May, 2000 a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION has been deposited in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following: 
Donald J. Purser, Esq. Jon V. Harper, Esq. 
Edward McBride, Esq. Anderson & Karrenberg 
Donald Joseph Purser & Assoc. 700 Bank One Tower 
2735 E. Parleys Way, Suite 303 50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Mark Hindley, Esq. 
Stoel Rievs LLP 
201 S. Main Street, #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
2 -
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II THE FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES WAGNER and JIM WAGNER, 
INC. , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NUSKIN INTERNATIONAL CORP., 
DENNIS CLIFTON, DAVID CLIFTON 
CLIFTON ASSOC. INC., LARS 
LYNGE and GORM INTERNATIONAL 
CORP., 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT OF GUY HUMPHRIES IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
:ase K, . 00400807 
Jivision #6 
STATE OF COLORADO 
COUNTY OF DENVER 
) ss, 
Guy Humphries, being first du] y sworn, states as follows: 
1. I am a Receiver appointed pursuant to an Order entered by 
the Jefferson County District Court on December 14, 1999 in the 
case captioned "Dennis Clifton and Clifton Associates Inc. v. Ann 
Friis, Lars Lynge, individually and doing business as Gorm 
International, LLC, and Pronet International, Inc.", Case No. 9 9 CV 
3264. (the "Receivership Order") 
2. The Receivership Order directs me to manage, operate and 
protect what is referred to in the Receivership Order as the 
Clifton Nu Skin Downline. The Receivership Order further directs me 
to oversee the defense of any lawsuit against the Clifton Nu Skin 
Downline. The Clifton Nu Skin Downline is the same downline that is 
referred to as the Clifton Downline in the Complaint filed in this 
action. 
3. All statements contained in this Affidavit are based upon 
facts made known to me in my capacity as Receiver for the Clifton 
Nu Skin Downline. 
4. Gorm International Corp. is a Colorado corporation which 
was incorporated on October 21, 1994. On June 18, 1998, Gorm 
International Corp. changed its name to Pronet International, Inc. 
5. Lars Lynge was the "Principal Partner" of Gorm 
International Corp. Gorm International Corp.'s only contacts with 
the Utah forum have been through its agent, Lars Lynge. Those 
contacts are as set forth in 59 of the Lynge Affidavit filed in 
support of his Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
in this case. 
Qtfy <5fiimphrig^ , Receiver 
A Subscribed and sworn to by Guy Humphries before 
me this / 9> . daY o f MaY/ 2000, in the City and County of Denver, 
State of Colorado. 
My Commission expires: AsJ?JsUi^L^l 3fJ{QD3t 
[SEAL] 
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DONAICI JosEDh PURSER 
DONAI- I fMSEIHJ... ; r 9 ^
 Pv cnri • & Associates, P.C. 
Jul £3 ^ ^.g f f j *yy Attorneys and Counselors at Law 
Eiwy Shex/dl 
Direct Line (801) 994-0920 
June 19, 2000 
^ 
HONORABLE RAYMOND M. HARDING, JR. 
Fourth District Court Judge 
125 North 100 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 Facsimile; (801) 429-1137 
Re: Wagner et al., v, Gorm International, at al. 
C'tvi! No. 000400307 
Dear Judge Harding: 
I am writing this letter to modify a position that I took during yesterday's hearing 
regarding the above-referenced matter. As you know, an issue arose regarding the effect of the 
mandatory mediation/arbitration clause contained in the Nu Skin Policy and Procedure Handbook. 
This matter was addressed by Mr. Martin Denny. Following Mr. Denny's statements to the Court, 
and without proper consideration, I asked the Court to consider the validity of the arbitration 
clause. Since the issues of jurisdiction and arbitration appear to be related, I thought that as a 
practical matter is would expedite the case. Upon further reflection, and for the reasons set forth 
below, I hereby withdraw that request. 
The Complaint as it stands names three distributors of Nu Skin, Gorm Internatiotlal, 
Clifton Associates and Dennis Clifton, and two individuals, Lars Lynge and David Clifton. As 
counsel indicated yesterday, neither Lars Lynge nor David Clifton distributed Nu Skin under their 
own names. As such, it is our position that the arbitration clause is not binding between plaintiffs 
and these individuals since they were not distributors'of Nu Skin. This is particularly true with 
respect to the tort claims alleged against them. 
With respect to the remaining defendants, who are distributors, I intend to file an 
Amended Complaint containing a claim for declaratory relief, as is my right under Rule 15 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Namely, the cause of action will seek a declaration that the Nu 
Skin "contract" is valid and binding upon distributors, requiring them to submit to arbitration in 
Utah. Defendants' contention that this is an "adhesion" contract will likely be at issue again. As 
grounds for alternative relief, the Complaint will allege the same claims against the Nu Skin 
Distributor Defendants as the original Complaint. The Amended Complaint will not have any 
impact on the personal jurisdiction issues before the Court. 
In light of the apparent complexity of these issues, I believe that the parties and the 
Court are better suited to address the arbitration issue under a separate, written motion, 
accompanied by a Memorandum of Law. I intend to file such motion, assuming that the Court 
finds personal jurisdiction over the parties, after I have better framed the issues in an Amended 
Complaint. 
2735 East Parleys Way, Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
(801) 532-3555 
Fax: (801) 537-1212 
E-mail: Purserlaw@aol.com 
*ALso admitted in Virginia 
^Atso admitted in Wyoming Cp 2 "> 
+Also admitted in New York "*- ^ 
Honorable Raymond M. Harding, Jr. 
July 19, 2000 
Page Two 
As such, at this point I intend to file a supplemental brief 
issues discussed yesterday. 
Thank you. 
Very truly yours, 
Edward ^ /McBr ide , Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
EWM:ken 
cc: Jon Harper via fax and US mail 
Richard Mitchell via fax and US mail 
Mark Hindley via fax and US mail 
Martin Denney via fax and US mail 
